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49 RICH. L. REV. 731 (2015)

THE EXECUTIONERS‘ DILEMMAS
Eric Berger *
INTRODUCTION
When people learn that I study lethal injection, they are usually curious to know more (or at least they are polite enough to ask
questions). Interestingly, the question that arises most often—
from lawyers, law students, and laypeople—is why states behave
as they do. In the wake of botched executions and ample evidence
of lethal injection‘s dangers, why do states fail to address their
execution procedures‘ systemic risks? Similarly, why do states so
vigorously resist requests to disclose their execution procedures‘
details?
This symposium essay takes a stab at answering these questions. In the interest of full disclosure, I should admit that I first
came to these cases as a litigator challenging the constitutionality
1
of the procedures in question. During these cases, I became convinced—and remain convinced—that some states (perhaps many)
do not devote sufficient care to their lethal injection procedures
and that consequently those procedures can create a substantial
risk of serious pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment‘s pro2
hibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Though many states‘
procedures have changed in important ways in the past few
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. I thank Ginger
Anders, Anne Duncan, Jim Gibson, Megan McCracken, and the participants in the University of Richmond Law Review‘s Allen Chair Symposium on Lethal Injection, Politics,
and the Future of the Death Penalty for extremely helpful suggestions on earlier drafts. I
also thank Nate Clark and Krystia Reed for splendid research assistance and Leah Stiegler, Sheherezade Malik, and the other wonderful editors of the University of Richmond
Law Review for organizing this symposium. A McCollum Grant helped support the writing
of this symposium contribution.
1. While in private practice, I worked on Michael Taylor‘s lethal injection challenge
in the Western District of Missouri and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, and Clarence Hill‘s case in the Supreme Court of the United States. See Brief for
Petitioner, Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006) (No. 05-8794), 2006 WL 558284; Taylor
v. Crawford (No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG), 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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years, the recent record of mistakes and botched executions supports this conclusion.3
Scholarship in this area aptly documents lethal injection‘s
risks, so I will only briefly summarize those dangers here.4 Instead, this essay ponders why states insist on carrying on as they
always have when the problems seem so egregious. I admit that
my contribution here is speculative; it is impossible to know for
certain what drives state officials‘ behavior. (Even if we were to
ask state officials, it is doubtful they would all give a fully candid
answer. Some of them might not even know themselves.) I also
fully concede that motivations differ from state to state, and even
from official to official. Politicians, correctional officials, and execution team members all likely have different motives for their
5
behavior. States may also keep their procedures secret for one
reason and refuse to revise them for other reasons. Finally, I
acknowledge that some states are more careful than others, and
that while there are surely bad actors, there are also responsible
officials who work hard to create safe and painless execution
methods.
That all said, some states do not design careful execution procedures, and to the extent such states often vigorously deny that
anything is wrong and fight to keep their procedure details a secret, this article seeks to explore the many reasons behind such
behavior. Execution team members and department of corrections
officials face various pressures that often make them prioritize
3. See infra Part I.
4. See Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the Problem of Constitutional Remedies, 27
YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 259, 260–62 (2009) [hereinafter Berger, Remedies] (explaining how
certain lethal injection procedures create a substantial risk of excruciating pain); Eric
Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C. L. REV.
1367, 1371–72 (2014) [hereinafter Berger, Secrecy]; Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection
Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1335–39 (2014) [hereinafter Denno, Chaos] (discussing the history of lethal injection in the U.S. and the lack of medical testing of lethal injection); Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled
the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 59 (2007) [hereinafter Denno, Quandary] (discussing the need for a humane method of execution); Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What it Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 65–69 (2002) [hereinafter
Denno, Paradox] (concluding that justice does not exist with the current methods of execution).
5. For ease of presentation, I organize my discussion by type of explanation rather
than kind of state official. Some explanations apply to various levels of state actors. However, as I indicate in places, some explanations help clarify certain governmental actors‘
behaviors better than others.
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factors other than execution safety.6 Of course, it is impossible in
a short symposium contribution to fully explore all the states‘
reasons, but given the disconnect between lethal injection‘s critics
and state officials‘ behavior, it is a valuable exercise.
Part I briefly summarizes lethal injection‘s risks, states‘ efforts
to keep key details of their procedures secret, and states‘ refusal
to address the systemic risks posed by those procedures. Part II
explores potential reasons for state behavior, offering epistemic,
structural, strategic, and political explanations. Part III concludes by noting that this analysis likely is relevant beyond the
lethal injection setting and can help us better understand official
motivations when states violate constitutional rights in other areas as well.
I. THE PROBLEM
The dangers of lethal injection have been well rehearsed else7
where, so I will offer only a short summary here. In the past two
years, there have been botched executions in South Dakota (Eric
Robert), Oklahoma (Michael Lee Wilson and Clayton Lockett),
8
Arizona (Joseph Wood), and Ohio (Dennis McGuire). The failures
6. A ―safe‖ execution or drug in the lethal injection context is one that does not pose a
substantial risk of serious pain, thereby complying with the Eighth Amendment standard
announced by the Supreme Court in Baze v. Rees. See 553 U.S. 35, 52 (2008) (plurality
opinion). Obviously, to the extent the drugs are used to cause the death of a human being,
they are not ―safe‖ in the common sense of the word. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at
1382–87.
7. For a more comprehensive review of recent problems, see Denno, Chaos, supra
note 4, at 1341 (discussing how states have not attempted to medically improve on lethal
injection procedures that are consistently problematic). See also Berger, Secrecy, supra
note 4, at 1371.
8. See Erik Eckholm, Arizona Takes Nearly 2 Hours to Execute Inmate, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 2014, at A1 [hereinafter Eckholm, Arizona] (discussing how Joseph Wood gasped
repeatedly and took nearly two hours to die after being injected); Erik Eckholm, One Execution Botched, Oklahoma Delays the Next, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.ny
times.com/2014/04/30/us/oklahoma-executions.html [hereinafter Eckholm, Botched] (discussing how Clayton Lockett twitched, gasped, called out, ―Oh man,‖ mumbled, shook his
foot, and raised up off the gurney after being injected); Dana Ford & Ashley Fantz, Controversial Execution in Ohio Uses New Drug Combination, CNN (Jan. 17, 2014, 1:01 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/16/justice/ohio-dennis-mcguire-execution/ (discussing how
Dennis McGuire gasped, snorted deeply multiple times, and appeared to be choking after
being injected); Jason Hancock, Execution Secrecy Draws Criticism in Missouri, KAN. CITY
STAR (Feb. 7, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.joliejustus.com/execution_secrecy_draws_crit
icism_in_missouri (discussing how Michael Lee Wilson cried out, ―I feel my whole body
burning‖ after being injected with pentobarbital); Steve Young, Execution: South Dakota
Delivers Eric Robert His Death Wish, ARGUSLEADER.COM (Oct. 16, 2012), http://archive.ar
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have occurred in one-drug, two-drug, and three-drug procedures,
and they have sometimes been gruesome. Clayton Lockett, for instance, twitched and gasped, while a prison official called out
―Man . . . something‘s wrong.‖9 He then mumbled, shook his foot,
and started convulsing violently, trying to rise up off the gurney.10
Prison officials subsequently discovered a ―vein failure‖ because
―the line had blown.‖11 During Joseph Wood‘s execution, the inmate gasped over 600 times and took nearly two hours to die.12
To lethal injection‘s critics, these recent botches are confirmation of a problem they have long known to exist. Many states retain the three-drug procedure, which contains two drugs that
cause excruciating pain in people who are inadequately anesthe13
tized. The procedure uses an anesthetic (usually thiopental or
pentobarbital), a paralytic inhibiting muscle movement (usually
pancuronium bromide or vecuronium bromide), and potassium
chloride, which induces cardiac arrest and stops the heart.14 It is
undisputed that potassium chloride causes agonizing pain as it
sears its way through the veins to the heart.15 It is furthermore
undisputed that the paralytic masks such pain.16 Because pancuronium bromide paralyzes the diaphragm, it also causes the terrifying sensation of suffocation.17 The constitutionality of the threedrug procedure therefore depends primarily on whether the first

gusleader.com/article/20121016/NEWS/310160016/Execution-South-Dakota-delivers-EricRobert-his-death-wish (discussing how Eric Robert gasped and snorted heavily, turned
purple, and took twenty minutes to die).
9. See Eckholm, Botched, supra note 8.
10. See id.; Greg Botelho & Dana Ford, Oklahoma Stops Execution After Botching
Drug Delivery; Inmate Dies, CNN (Oct. 9, 2014, 2:55 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/
29/us/oklahoma-botched-execution/.
11. See Botelho & Ford, supra note 10; Eckholm, Botched, supra note 8.
12. See Eckholm, Arizona, supra note 8; Arizona Botches Execution of Joseph Wood,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/5828 (last visited Feb.
27, 2015).
13. See Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1359 (providing a chart listing fourteen states
retaining some version of the three-drug protocol).
14. See id. at 1333–34, 1349, 1359. As Professor Denno‘s study shows, there is substantial variation in procedures among the states. Id. at 1359.
15. See Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 883 (M.D. Tenn. 2007); Mark
Dershwitz & Thomas K. Henthorn, The Pharmacokinetics and Pharmacodynamics of Thiopental as Used in Lethal Injection, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 931, 931 (2008).
16. Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 883–84.
17. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 55 (2007) (plurality opinion); Harbison, 511 F.
Supp. 2d at 883–84.
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drug, the anesthetic, takes proper effect.18 If it does, the inmate is
fully anesthetized within two-and-one-half minutes.19 If it does
not, the paralyzed inmate may seem peaceful while experiencing
the dual agony of suffocation and intense burning throughout his
body.20
It is bad enough that many states still employ a procedure using drugs that indisputably cause excruciating pain in the improperly anesthetized.21 It is far worse that states‘ unqualified
personnel considerably heighten the procedure‘s dangers.22 The
list of mistakes that states have made is astounding. States have
misunderstood the drugs, believing, for instance, that they ought
to be injected in rapid succession, not realizing that the anesthet23
ic requires a couple of minutes to take effect. Of course, if the
other drugs are injected before the anesthetic has taken effect,
the inmate will suffer excruciating pain but be paralyzed and
therefore appear peaceful.
States have also had serious problems setting the catheter connecting the intravenous (―IV‖) line with the inmates‘ veins. If the
IV line is improperly set, the drugs will not all be delivered successfully into the vein but will instead infiltrate, leaking into surrounding tissues.24 Infiltration itself is excruciating, and it can also result in inadequate anesthesia.25 Some states‘ failure to
employ qualified personnel to set the IV line heightens the risk of
infiltration,26 as does the fact that states do not always provide
their execution teams with the proper equipment to safely set the
catheter.27 Catheter problems contributed substantially to the
18. See Ty Alper, Anesthetizing the Public Conscience: Lethal Injection and Animal
Euthanasia, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817, 818–20 (2008).
19. See Henthorn Expert Report at ¶ 24, Taylor v. Crawford (No. 05-4173), 2006 WL
1236660 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) [hereinafter Henthorn Report] (explaining the speed
with which thiopental takes effect).
20. See Dershwitz & Henthorn, supra note 15, at 933–36.
21. As of 2014, fourteen states still retained some version of the three-drug protocol.
See Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1359.
22. See Berger, Remedies, supra note 4, at 270.
23. See id. at 268 (noting that Missouri executioners injected drugs as quickly as possible because they incorrectly believed the prisoner would be unconscious within fifteen
seconds); see also Deposition of Larry Crawford at 130, Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035.
24. See Berger, Remedies, supra note 4, at 270.
25. Id.
26. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1377, 1433.
27. See OKLA. DEP‘T OF PUB. SAFETY, The Execution of Clayton D. Lockett: Executive
Summary 16, http://www.dps.state.ok.us/Investigation/14-0189SI%20Summary.pdf (last
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botched executions of Clayton Lockett in Oklahoma and Angel
Diaz in Florida.28
States also have had difficulty accurately assessing the inmate‘s anesthetic depth, believing an inmate to be unconscious
when he was not.29 As a result, states have sometimes injected the
second and third drugs before an inmate was sufficiently anesthetized.30 Further compounding all these problems, states often fail
to provide sufficient oversight, transparency, and contingency
plans for their procedures.31 These failures collectively heighten
the risk that lethal injection will result in excruciating pain.
In theory, the switch in several states from a three-drug protocol to a one-drug protocol should mitigate these problems by eliminating the drugs that create a risk of pain. In reality, though,
states have had difficulty finding safe drugs. For example, in response to recent drug shortages, many states have sought drugs
from compounding pharmacies. Compounding pharmacies usually mix small quantities of drugs to order, but because they elude
many Food and Drug Administration (―FDA‖) regulations, their
products are rarely evaluated for safety and effectiveness.32 Compounding pharmacies also often use active pharmaceutical ingredients from complex and unsecured supply chains that can be diverted through ―grey markets,‖ making it impossible to verify
33
whether the ingredients conform to FDA requirements. It is also
not uncommon for compounding pharmacies‘ ingredients to be

visited Feb. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Lockett Execution Report] (noting that the staff did not
have access to a long enough catheter to attempt a femoral insertion but that the staff attempted femoral access anyway).
28. Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1433.
29. See Eckholm, Botched, supra note 8; Ford & Fantz, supra note 8 (noting that after
Lockett had been declared unconscious, the state administered the second and third drugs,
at which point Lockett began gasping and bucking on the gurney).
30. See Locket Execution Report, supra note 27, at 11–12, 25.
31. See Berger, Remedies, supra note 4, at 272 (noting that some states have inconsistent procedures, poor recordkeeping, and no contingency plans to address problems that
may arise).
32. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1382.
33. See John L. Chollet & Michael J. Jozwiakowski, Quality Investigation of Hydroxyprogesterone Caproate Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient and Injection, 38 DRUG DEV. IND.
PHARM. 540, 543 (2012) (noting that many sources of active pharmaceutical ingredients
were ―brokers who import and repackage drugs‖ and who had neither registered with nor
been inspected by the FDA); see also Declaration of Larry D. Sasich at ¶ 12, Taylor v.
Apothecary Shoppe, LLC (No. 14-CV-063) 2014, WL 631664 (N.D. Okla. Feb 18, 2014)
[hereinafter Sasich Declaration].
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mislabeled, resulting in final products that are not what they
purport to be.34
Compounding pharmacies perform an important service by
mixing small batches of drugs to order, but they are licensed to
dispense drugs, not to manufacture them.35 Consequently, they
often lack the basic infrastructure necessary to produce, for instance, sterile, potent, and safe injectable pentobarbital, which
many lethal injection states now use in either one-drug or threedrug procedures.36 Moreover, FDA pharmacy inspections have
found, with alarming frequency, that compounding pharmacies
and similar facilities purporting to produce sterile drug products
did not follow procedures designed to prevent microbiological con37
tamination of those products. In short, many compounding
pharmacies‘ practices exacerbate the risk that their products will
be seriously impure, contaminated, sub-potent, super-potent, or
otherwise flawed.38 Unsurprisingly, problems with compounded

34. See Editorial, Compounding Pharmacies Need FDA Oversight, WASH. POST (Oct.
16, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/compounding-pharmacies-need-fda-ov
ersight/2012/10/16/12e5ee78-17af-11e2-9855-71f2b202721b_story.html.
35. See Bette Hileman, Drug Regulation, C&EN, Apr. 12, 2004, at 24 (discussing the
lack of regulation and capacities of compounding pharmacies).
36. See Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1359; Jennifer Gudeman et al., Potential Risks
of Pharmacy Compounding, 13 DRUGS IN R&D 1, 3 (2012) (explaining that some compounding pharmacies have expanded their activities beyond their technological capabilities and that ―poor practices on the part of drug compounders can result in contamination
or in products that do not possess the strength, quality, and purity required‖ for a safe
drug); Mark Thomas et al., I.V. Admixture Contamination Rates: Traditional Practice Site
Versus a Class 1000 Cleanroom, 62 AM. J. HEALTH-SYST. PHARM. 2386, 2386 (2005) (finding the contamination in compounded medication even when technicians compounded it in
sterile environments, such as a cleanroom); Sasich Declaration, supra note 33, at ¶ 12.
37. See DEP‘T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., INSPECTION FOR ABRAMS ROYAL PHARMACY
(Dec. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Pharmaceutical Safety Overview], available at http://www.
fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofGlobalRegulatoryOperationsandPoli
cy/ORA/ORAElectronicReadingRoom/UCM379743.pdf.
38. Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1384; see Sasich Declaration, supra note 33, at ¶
12; Phil Johnson & Gregg Jones, Pharmacist Compounding of Analgestic Medication: The
Risk of a Little-Known Practice, 84 J. FLA. M.A. 13, 14 (1997) (discussing how compounded
products are never tested as rigorously as a commercial product); 2006 Limited FDA Survey of Compounded Drug Products, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Guidance ComplianceRegulatoryInformation/PharmacyCompounding/ucm204237.htm (last visited Feb. 27,
2015) (noting at least 240 instances of illness and death associated with compounded
drugs between 1990 and 2005); Pharmaceutical Safety Overview, supra note 37.
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drugs have caused public health emergencies,39 and have also
played a role in recent botched executions.40
Despite these botches and dangers, states often act as though
there is no problem. Indeed, states repeatedly deny that their lethal injection procedures pose a risk of pain.41 They similarly refuse to conduct a careful, systematic review of their procedures‘
dangers.42 This is not to say that states never change their procedures. On the contrary, they change them frequently.43 But these
changes often do not make the procedures safer. For example, after Ohio experienced serious problems with its three-drug procedure, it designed a convoluted two-part protocol, which included a
back-up plan requiring the team to inject an overdose of two
44
drugs never before used in executions. Though experts warned
that these back-up drugs, hydromorphone and midazolam ―could

39. See Todd Wallack, Victims of Tainted Drug Face Long Wait for Relief, BOS. GLOBE
(Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/10/01/new-england-compoundingvictims-still-waiting-for-compensation-year-after-meningitis-outbreak/3zUCXAnXtTC21Y
g4AQR3tI/story.html (discussing contaminated steroids from a Massachusetts compounding pharmacy that recently caused fungal meningitis in approximately 750 people, at least
sixty-four of whom died).
40. See Sasich Declaration, supra note 33, at ¶¶ 61–63; Hancock, supra note 8; Elliot
C. McLaughlin, Appeals Court Stays Texas Execution After Intellectual Disability Claim,
CNN (May 14, 2014, 8:07 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/13/justice/texas-execution-rob
ert-james-campbell/ (noting that Luis Villegas ―complained of a burning sensation during
his April execution‖ in Texas using compounded pentobarbital); South Dakota Covers Up
Source of ‘DIY’ Death Penalty Drugs Ahead of Execution, REPRIEVE (Oct. 30, 2012), http://
www.reprieve.org.uk/press/2012_10_30_South_Dakota_execution_drugs/; Young, supra
note 8.
41. See, e.g., Ben Brumfield et al., No Evidence Arizona Execution Botched, Corrections Chief Says, CNN (Sept. 8, 2014, 7:15 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/24/justice/
arizona-execution-controversy/index.html (discussing the denial by the director of the Arizona Department of Corrections that Joseph Wood suffered during his execution); Josh
Levs et al., Oklahoma’s Botched Lethal Injection Marks New Front in Battle Over Executions, CNN (Sept. 8, 2014, 7:16 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/30/us/oklahoma-botchedexecution/index.html (discussing Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin‘s declaration that Lockett was declared unconscious prior to his execution); Stephanie Mencimer, Arizona’s Terrible Lethal Injection Track Record, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 1, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.
motherjones.com/politics/2014/08/arizonas-terrible-lethal-injection-track-record (discussing the Arizona Corrections Chief‘s statement that the execution of Robert Comer was accomplished with ―careful planning,‖ even though they hired a doctor who Arizona knew
had been banned from participating in executions in Missouri).
42. See, e.g., Lethal Injection: Texas Switches to New Drug as Next Execution Approaches, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/lethal-injectiontexas-switches-new-drug-next-execution-approaches (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
43. See Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1335.
44. See id. at 1357.

BERGER 493.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

THE EXECUTIONERS‘ DILEMMAS

3/6/2015 4:21 PM

739

produce a slow, lingering death‖ and induce a state of confusion
and extreme psychological anguish, the state still stuck with it.45
If anything, the constant changes make lethal injection all the
more unpredictable, as states‘ execution procedures often differ
dramatically not only from state to state but within the same
state.46 Indeed, some states swerve haphazardly from one procedure to another, reacting to mistakes or botches by attempting
quick fixes that leave other problems unaddressed. Oklahoma, for
instance, hastily revised its procedure after the botched execution
of Michael Lee Wilson, only to botch Clayton Lockett‘s execution
just a few months later.47 The State then changed its procedure
again, but rather than taking the time to do so carefully, it
rushed to complete the revision to continue executions as expedi48
tiously as possible. Though serious questions remained about its
new procedure, on January 15, 2015, Oklahoma executed Charles
Warner, who called out from the gurney, ―My body is on fire.‖49
Two days later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Glossip
v. Gross to review Oklahoma‘s approach.50
Other states, without any better idea of how to proceed, simply
imitate other states‘ procedures, without regard to those states‘
records. For example, after contaminated compounded drugs contributed to a botched execution in South Dakota, Pennsylvania
announced it would also use the same kind of compounded
drugs.51 Similarly, despite serious problems in Arizona with midazolam, Alabama, Ohio, Oklahoma, and other states have recently revised their procedures to include midazolam.52 Thus, as Pro45. See Cooey v. Strickland, 604 F.3d 939, 942–43 (6th Cir. 2010); Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1357.
46. See Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1335.
47. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1386.
48. See ASSOC. PRESS, State Prepares to Resume Executions, But Questions Linger,
MUSKOGEE PHX. (Oct. 5, 2014, 12:03 AM), http://www.muskogeephoenix.com/news/oklaho
ma_news/article_e26c0b36-4c4c-11e4-8666-17ea756064ce.html [hereinafter Questions
Linger].
49. Dana Ford, Oklahoma Executes Charles Warner, CNN (Jan. 16, 2015, 6:13 AM),
http:// www.cnn.com/2015/01/15/us/oklahoma-execution-charles-frederick-warner/.
50. Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. Jan. 12, 2015), cert. granted sub nom.,
Glossip v. Gross, 83 U.S.L.W. 3625 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2015) (No. 14-7955).
51. See Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1376–77; Young, supra note 8.
52. See ASSOC. PRESS, Judge Allows Okla. to Continue Executions After Botched Case;
Opponents Had Argued Against New Protocol, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 23, 2014, at A7, 4; Tim
Lockette, Stay Upheld for Death Row Inmate Thomas Arthur, ANNISTON STAR, Jan. 6,
2015, at 3.
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fessor Deborah Denno contends, despite the ―continuous tinkering,‖ states have failed to grapple with lethal injection‘s most
troubling aspects, such as underqualified executioners, a lack of
medical expertise, and a ―failure to account for the difficulties
with injecting inmates whose drug-use histories diminish the
availability of usable veins.‖53
The problem, then, is often not that states refuse to modify
their procedures, but rather that in so doing they often fail to address lethal injection‘s systemic dangers.54 Rather than deliberately and carefully designing a new procedure, they often rush to
address crises created by drug shortages and botched executions
in the hopes of resuming executions without significant delay.55 If
anything, as Professor Denno argues, ―As states‘ desperation in56
creases, so does their tolerance for risk.‖
It is important to acknowledge that there may be exceptions to
this mostly dismal record. For example, though many states have
had difficulty finding safe drugs, the switch in some states to a
one-drug procedure should, in theory, make lethal injection safer.
Relatedly, whereas most states fight vigorously to conceal the details of their procedures, Delaware‘s Department of Justice found
that the Department of Corrections violated the State‘s Freedom
of Information Act by denying a reporter‘s request for access to
57
the procedure. Additionally, several states do not have a record
of visibly botched executions.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that while some
states have behaved better than others, many states have revised
their procedures because they thought that they had no choice,
not because they have voluntarily sought ways to improve their
procedures. For example, Ohio was the first state to switch to a
one-drug protocol, but it did so because a court ordered this rem-

53. Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1335.
54. See, e.g., id. at 1337; Kate Brumback, Georgia to Use Compounding Pharmacy;
State Needs Drug for Man’s Execution, AUGUSTA CHRON., July 12, 2013, at B6.
55. See, e.g., Questions Linger, supra note 48 (describing Oklahoma‘s efforts to put in
place a new procedure following botches in time to conduct an execution in November 2014
even though, as a critic pointed out, it was ―an awfully short time‖).
56. Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1336.
57. See Freedom of Information Act Appeal Concerning Department of Correction,
Del. Op. Att‘y Gen. 11-IIB14, 2011 WL 4062225, at *1 (2011); Denno, Chaos, supra note 4,
at 1380.
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edy.58 Similarly, when a state badly botches an execution, it often
feels pressure to revise the procedure.59 Drug shortages have also
forced states to modify their procedures in recent years.60 These
changes have not necessarily made things better. To the extent
states frequently now turn to compounding pharmacies, they may
in fact make the procedures more dangerous.61 In short, though
the point can be overstated, on the whole, states have oftentimes
tried to keep secret and defend even the sketchiest lethal injection procedures.
II. EXPLANATIONS
Numerous explanations help shed light on state officials‘ behavior. Admittedly, this analysis is largely speculative. It is impossible to get into the executioner‘s head, and motives likely differ from person to person and from state to state. Additionally,
some explanations speak to both state secrecy and state intransigence (i.e., unwillingness to modify seriously flawed procedures),
whereas some speak to just one or the other. In short, the theories offered here do not purport to explain every instance of state
behavior in lethal injection. Instead, they try to shed some general light on why states in this area so often seem to disregard
constitutional concerns.
A. Epistemological Explanations
Perhaps the most straightforward explanation is that state officials simply believe that their execution procedures are safe.62
Many executions appear unproblematic, and states likely believe
58. See State v. Rivera (No. 04CR065940) 2008 WL 2784679, at *6 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
June 10, 2008) (―[T]he use of two drugs in the lethal injection protocol (pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride) creates an unnecessary and arbitrary risk that the condemned will experience an agonizing and painful death.‖); Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at
1354 (discussing Rivera).
59. See Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Botched Execution Could Renew ‘Cruel’ Challenges,
OKLA. DAILY, May 1, 2014, at 1.
60. See Kevin Sack, Shortage of Widely Used Anesthetics Is Delaying Executions in
Some States, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, at A23.
61. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1384; Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1366
(discussing the risks associated with compounding pharmacies).
62. Cf. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 62 (2008) (plurality opinion) (―The firing squad,
hanging, the electric chair, and the gas chamber have each in turn given way to more humane methods, culminating in today‘s consensus on lethal injection.‖).
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that if an execution seems peaceful, then it must be painless.
Some officials may then conclude that if nothing seems amiss,
then nothing is.
States, in fact, might have many reasons for believing that
their lethal injection procedures are safe—some more justifiable
than others. States using a one-drug procedure with an overdose
of a barbiturate anesthetic might reason that a drug that only
anesthetizes cannot cause pain, even if things do not proceed perfectly. Of course, because compounding pharmacies do not always
use proper procedures to manufacture such drugs,63 even these
theoretically ―safe‖ drugs can behave in unpredictable ways.64 As
explained above, many compounding pharmacies‘ practices
heighten the risk that their drugs will cause pain because they
65
are dangerously contaminated, impure, or otherwise flawed.
Nevertheless, states may honestly believe that these drugs cannot cause pain, especially given that inmates challenging the
three-drug procedure have themselves argued that a one-drug
approach would be safer.66
Many states may also believe their procedures are safe because
they have received some expert advice telling them that they are.
Perhaps most prominently, Dr. Mark Dershwitz, an anesthesiologist and pharmacologist at the University of Massachusetts, has
repeatedly testified on behalf of states‘ lethal injection procedures.67 Other experts, of course, disagree. One prominent expert,
in fact, thought it ―very unlikely that any other medical experts
who are familiar with these drugs will be willing to support‖ some
63. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1382–83; Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1370
(―As concern grew that some pharmacies were exceeding the scope of traditional compounding practices, the FDA issued reports in 2003 and 2006 revealing the discovery of
compounded drugs that failed safety and efficacy tests, as well as serious illnesses and
deaths that had occurred in association with compounded drugs.‖).
64. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1383–84; J.H. Perrin, Comments on Drugs
Difficult to Compound and the Quality of Chemicals to Be Used in Compounding, 25 DRUG
DEV. & INDUS. PHARM. 553, 555 (1999) (explaining that compounded drugs for intravenous
use should never be released without testing for sterility, pyrogens, and chemical analyses).
65. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1432–33.
66. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 51, 57, Baze, 553 U.S. 35 (No. 07-5439).
67. Cf. Andrew Welsh-Huggins, States’ Leading Lethal Injection Expert Ends Role,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug. 21, 2014, at P5A (reporting that Mark Dershwitz, who testified on behalf of many states in lethal injection litigation, terminated his role when Ohio
mistakenly divulged that it had contacted him with information about a problematic execution).
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of the states‘ designed procedures.68 Nevertheless, a credible expert on their side may be enough to convince many state officials
that they need not worry too much about what they are doing.
Some officials may also believe their executions are safe, because they do not know enough to think otherwise. Simply put,
many state politicians, officials, and execution team members do
not understand the drugs and their risks. Arizona, for instance,
understood its drugs so poorly that it injected fifteen separate
doses of the drug cocktail into Joseph Wood.69 For years Missouri
injected the drugs of its three-drug procedure in rapid succession,
not realizing that the anesthetic required two-and-one-half
minutes to take effect.70
Other officials may understand in the abstract that lethal injection poses risks but nevertheless fall prey to the heuristic bias
that their state will not experience problems.71 Lethal injection, if
properly implemented and administered, is not inherently unsafe.
Officials may, therefore, reassure themselves that everything will
proceed smoothly. In fact, this reassurance may prevent some officials from attending to important details that can minimize the
risk of excruciating pain.
Relatedly, even if some states realize that their procedures
pose substantial risks of pain, they may lack the expertise to revise the procedure meaningfully. Lethal injection is a complicated
procedure that requires expertise at several steps along the way.
To do it right, states need to take care that they select the right
drugs, find a safe and reliable drug provider, prepare the chemi68. See id. (quoting Dr. Mark Heath, a Columbia University anesthesiologist).
69. See Tom Dart, Arizona Inmate Joseph Wood Was Injected 15 Times with Execution
Drugs, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug /
02/arizona-inmate-injected-15-times-execution-drugs-joseph-wood; Tierney Sneed, Can the
Death Penalty Survive Lethal Injection?, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 7, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.
usnews.com/news/articles/2014/08/07/can-the-death-penalty-survive-lethal-injection.
70. See Defendant Crawford‘s Answers to Plaintiffs‘ First Interrogatories at 9, Taylor
v. Crawford (No. 05-4173), 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) (containing an explanation by the Department of Corrections Director that lethal injection drugs are injected in rapid succession); Henthorn Report, supra note 19, at 7.
71. See generally Daniel P. Forbes, Are Some Entrepreneurs More Overconfident Than
Others?, 20 J. BUS. VENTURING 623, 626 (2005) (describing the overconfidence bias); Paul
C. Price et al., Perceived Event Frequency and the Optimistic Bias: Evidence for a TwoProcess Model of Personal Risk Judgments, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 242, 242–
43 (2002) (explaining that people typically demonstrate an optimism bias when they judge
their risk of experiencing a negative event and believe their risk to be lower than the risk
their peers face).
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cals properly, insert the catheter correctly into the inmate‘s veins,
accurately monitor the inmate‘s consciousness, and more.72 State
departments of corrections (―DOCs‖) not only lack the expertise to
perform most of these steps but may even lack the expertise to
know where to find the correct experts. Moreover, even when
states know enough to approach the right people, those people
may be very reluctant to involve themselves in the business of
killing people.73 In other words, the states‘ epistemological deficits
may impede them both from recognizing and correcting problems.
In fairness, it is important to acknowledge that some states
might be correct that their procedures are safe.74 Several states
have executed people without botches in recent years.75 Of course,
it is impossible to know what an inmate feels during an execution. Moreover, states that continue to use pancuronium bromide
or similar paralytics do not deserve the benefit of the doubt, because they deliberately use a drug that masks any pain the in76
mate might feel. To this extent, the absence of visible botches is
hardly conclusive evidence that these states have not had problems. Nevertheless, it is possible that many—perhaps even
most—apparently unproblematic executions are, in fact, painless,
as they are supposed to be. To this extent, the absence of visible
botches in some states is an indication (albeit non-determinative)
that those states‘ procedures are smoother.
While it seems likely that some state officials honestly believe
that their states‘ procedures are safe, it is important to emphasize that this epistemological explanation only goes so far. Indeed,
there are many instances in which states have recognized prob77
lems and yet have decided to proceed anyway. For example, a
report in Ohio revealed that Ohio prison officials had been concerned about the drug combination used for Dennis McGuire but

72. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1427.
73. See Matt McCarthy, What’s the Best Way to Execute Someone?, SLATE (Mar. 27,
2014, 11:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/20
14/03/death_penalty_drugs_lethal_injection_executions_are_so_bad_that_it_s_time.html.
74. See Denise Grady, Three-Drug Protocol Persists for Lethal Injections, Despite Ease
of Using One, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2014, at A16.
75. See id.
76. Dershwitz & Henthorn, supra note 15, at 931.
77. See, e.g., Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1356 n.159 (discussing Ohio‘s botched execution of Rommel Broom, the first inmate to survive a lethal injection procedure, despite
the record of inept executions).
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used it anyway, only to botch his execution.78 Similarly, despite
numerous reports about the dangers of compounded drugs, states
press forward with executions relying on such drugs without subjecting them to chemical testing that might identify flaws.79 In
short, states may not always fully appreciate the risks their execution procedures create, but they sometimes do and still refuse
to alter their behavior.
B. Structural Explanations
Another set of explanations is structural. These explanations
stem from the nature of state governments and the incentives
that help govern state official behavior. As with the other explanations, these likely do not each apply to each official in each
state. Nevertheless, they help provide a sense of another set of issues that may shape officials‘ actions.
1. State Sovereignty
As a general matter, states usually do not like being told what
to do. States prize their sovereignty and strongly resist outside
efforts to encroach upon their prerogative to set and implement
80
policy. Accordingly, their natural inclination is often to fight anyone who contends that they must change their practices.81 Indeed, whether pressures come from the federal government, in-

78. See Alan Johnson, Prison Official Had Predicted Ohio’s Troubling Execution,
COLUM. DISPATCH (Aug. 19, 2014, 4:44 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories
/local/2014/08/19/execution-scenario-had-been-predicted.html (discussing an e-mail sent by
the former chief legal counsel for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction
speculating that the drug combination Ohio planned to use would result in ―the condemned gasping for air in hyperventilating fashion‖).
79. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1419–21 (discussing the possibility of chemical testing); Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1360–61, 1365–66 (discussing the shortage of
lethal injection drugs and the risks of compounding pharmacies).
80. See generally Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485,
1521 (1994) (exploring the politics of federalism); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee
Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 78
(1988) (arguing that as republican governments, states should enjoy discretion to run their
governments as autonomous units without outside interference).
81. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258–59 (2009) (discussing ―uncooperative federalism‖ when
states resist federal policies that intrude on pre-existing state policies).
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terest groups, or death row inmates, states often resist external
efforts to change the way they do things.82
None of this is to say that state politicians and officials should
necessarily concede to outside efforts to change their practices.
States sometimes have very good reason to resist external interference in their affairs.83 Nevertheless, states also sometimes reflexively resist external advice or pressure, even when it may be
wiser to reconsider their current policies. In other words, states‘
zealous protection of their sovereignty, however justifiable in
some contexts, may in other contexts sometimes lead to an obdurate refusal to revise questionable practices.84
This obduracy may be especially commonplace in the context of
prisons, where states have grown very accustomed to operating in
85
secrecy and receiving great deference from courts. DOCs, indeed, are often successful in fending off lawsuits and other external meddling.86 As a result, states may be disinclined to consider
82. See, e.g., Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601
(2012) (discussing state objection to federal Medicaid expansion even though the federal
government paid the entire amount in the early years and no less than 90% after 2016);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149, 151, 154 (1992) (objecting to the federal
program regulating how states handle radioactive waste even though states had requested
the federal plan for disposing of such waste); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205, 211
(1987) (objecting to the federal plan raising the minimum drinking age that threatened to
withhold 5% of federal highway funds from states that did not comply).
83. Cf. Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 31,
84 (2013) (noting the severity of the public pension crisis on state and local governments
and the need for states to find creative ways to save money); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV.
341, 402 (1985) (―[I]f there is some genuine room for noninstrumental participation in
American political life, it can realistically exist only on the local level.‖).
84. See Thomas O. McGarity, Regulating Commuters to Clear the Air: Some Difficulties in Implementing a National Program at the Local Level, 27 PAC. L.J. 1521, 1523 (1996)
(discussing limited progress in air quality in the face of states‘ resistance to the implementation of the Clean Air Act).
85. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat.
1321; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90–91 (1987) (noting that ―courts should be particularly conscious of the ‗measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials‘‖ and upholding a rule barring inmate-to-inmate correspondence) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 827 (1974)); Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision Making, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465, 485–87 (2013) (discussing courts‘ practices of deferring
to state prisons).
86. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 362 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(―[C]ourts have been especially deferential to prison authorities ‗in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.‘‖) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 547 (1979)); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974), overruled in
part by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989) (―[F]ederal courts have adopted

BERGER 493.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

THE EXECUTIONERS‘ DILEMMAS

3/6/2015 4:21 PM

747

outside criticism about lethal injection because they are used to
insulating their prison systems from external review.87
To this extent, secrecy and intransigence can work hand in
hand. If states are not transparent about the details of their execution procedures, inmates lack the necessary information to
mount a serious Eighth Amendment challenge to the procedure.88
Relatedly, without detailed information about states‘ procedures,
outsiders have a hard time explaining precisely why those procedures may be dangerous. Secrecy, then, helps preserve the state‘s
sovereign prerogative to administer its own execution procedures.
A related factor is that states are understandably sensitive to
costs. States may believe that modifying their lethal injection
procedures would cost them money, because they will have to buy
new drugs, rethink their procedures‘ details, and potentially hire
and train new personnel. The death penalty is already extremely
expensive,89 and states may resist constant calls for revisions that
may cost even more, especially given that capital inmates will
continue to challenge even the safest procedures. Relatedly,
states may sometimes lack the resources to focus on improving
lethal injections because other issues demand correctional officials‘ more immediate attention.90
Of course, litigation is a large reason for capital punishment‘s
high price tag, so states‘ resistance to external advice may, paraa broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration. . . . [T]he problems of
prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning,
and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the
legislative and executive branches of government.‖).
87. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
88. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1372.
89. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New
Consideration Transforms an Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 117, 118 (2010) (discussing how the cost of the death penalty has increased in the modern era and has been a
prominent issue causing states to reconsider restricting the death penalty); Richard C. Dieter, Millions Misspent: What Politicians Don’t Say About the High Costs of the Death
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (1994), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/599
(―Death penalty cases are much more expensive than other criminal cases and cost more
than imprisonment for life with no possibility of parole.‖).
90. See, e.g., Martha Stoddard, Jon Bruning Says Other Crises Have ‘Diverted’ State
from Resolving Lethal Injection Problems, OMAHA.COM (Oct. 28, 2014, 1:00 AM), http://w
ww.omaha.com/news/crime/jon-bruning-says-other-crises-have-diverted-state-from-resolvi
ng/article_a2e13833-6364-510e-8557-0c10e5d69d90.html (explaining that a Nebraska
state prison sentencing fiasco diverted official money and attention from improving lethal
injection).
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doxically, sometimes cost them more than acquiescence would.91
That said, states, as already noted, often protect themselves from
these additional litigation costs by keeping their procedures a secret, thereby depriving inmates of the opportunity to mount a
successful challenge. To this extent, state obduracy can resist the
expense of changing execution procedures and state secrecy can
keep litigation costs down by insulating those procedures from
meaningful judicial review.92
2. Administrative Structures
It is important to remember that the most important decisions
about lethal injection are made not by state legislatures but by
administrative agencies, usually DOCs. To be sure, in some
states, legislatures designate the drugs for lethal injection by
93
statute. In most death penalty states, however, the legislature
delegates authority to make such determinations to DOCs.94 More
importantly, even where the legislature selects the drugs, DOCs
95
design and implement the procedures‘ details. Accordingly, state
executive officials necessarily make crucial decisions that determine the nature and safety of lethal injection.

91. See, e.g., LEGIS. AUDITOR, STATE OF NEV., PERFORMANCE AUDIT: FISCAL COSTS OF
DEATH PENALTY (2014) (concluding that case costs of pursing the death penalty average three times more than non-death penalty cases due to procedural safeguards); PETER
A. COLLINS ET AL., SEATTLE UNIV., AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF SEEKING THE
DEATH PENALTY IN WASHINGTON STATE 4 (2015) (indicating that average trial level defense and prosecution costs are 2.8 to 4.2 times more expensive in death penalty cases
than non-death penalty cases).
92. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1411.
93. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 137.473 (Cum. Supp. 2014) (―The punishment of death
shall be inflicted by the intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of an ultra-shortacting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent and potassium chloride
or other equally effective substances sufficient to cause death.‖).
94. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1 (2011 Repl. Vol.) (―A death sentence shall be executed by lethal injection, unless the person sentenced to death affirmatively elects to be
executed by electrocution.‖); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-757(A) (2009) (―The penalty of death
shall be inflicted by an intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death, under the supervision of the state department of corrections.‖).
95. See, e.g., Letter from Michael D. Crews, Sec‘y of the Fla. Dep‘t of Corr., to Rick
Scott, Governor of Fla. (Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/doc
uments/FLExecProtocol.pdf (discussing the Department of Corrections‘ responsibility of
implementing lethal injection procedures in Florida); Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at
1391 nn.164, 165 (citing two manuals published by state DOCs).
THE
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The institutional structures of DOCs, therefore, substantially
shape the states‘ attitudes towards lethal injection. Like many
administrative agents, DOC officials can suffer from tunnel vision, prioritizing narrow agency objectives more than broader social or constitutional values.96 Indeed, like other administrative
agencies, DOCs typically have narrow statutory mandates, which
do not always include a broad commitment to the rule of law and
constitutional norms.97
If anything, DOCs may be even more prone to tunnel vision
than other administrative agencies, because state administrative
law often exempts DOCs from ordinary administrative accountability mechanisms, such as state Administrative Procedure Acts
98
and Freedom of Information Acts. As a result, the institutional
incentives of DOCs in the death penalty context are likely to focus
more on carrying out executions expeditiously and less on Eighth
Amendment norms.99 States‘ willingness to procure lethal drugs
from any willing source, including sketchy fly-by-night overseas
96. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1408–09; Stephen Breyer, The Executive
Branch, Administrative Action, and Comparative Expertise, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189,
2195 (2011); Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment ―Due Process,‖ 83 HARV. L. REV. 518,
523 (1970).
97. See Glen Staszewski, Statutory Interpretation as Contestatory Democracy, 55 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 221, 257 (2013) (―[A]dministrative discretion has always been feared on
the grounds that agencies might adopt ‗tunnel vision.‘ . . .‖).
98. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617(g) (2013) (―The procedures [regarding lethal injection and its implementation] are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act of 1967.‖); MO. REV. STAT. § 536.010(6)(k) (2000) (exempting a ―statement concerning only inmates of an institution under the control of the department of corrections‖
from the definition of a ―rule‖); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-31.2 (2014) (classifying as
―confidential‖ the ―name, address, qualifications, and other identifying information relating to the identity of any person or entity supplying or administering the intravenous injection substance or substances‖ and treating disclosure of such information as a misdemeanor); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-504(h)(1) (2014) (treating records identifying
individuals or entities ―directly involved in the process of executing a sentence of death . . .
as confidential [and stating that they] shall not be open to public inspection‖); Id. § 4-5
102(12)(G) (2011) (exempting ―[s]tatements concerning inmates of a correctional . . . facility‖ from the definition of a ―rule‖); Jackson v. Danberg (No. 07M-09-141), 2008 WL
1850585, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2008) (holding that Delaware‘s lethal injection
protocol is not subject to state APA); Order Denying Temporary Restraining Order And/Or
Stay at 4, Hightower v. Donald (No. 2007CV135682), 2007 WL 4355844, at *2 (Ga. Super.
Ct. July 16, 2007) (―[T]he promulgation of these protocols regarding lethal injection by the
[Georgia] Department of Corrections are not subject to the requirements of the APA.‖);
Middleton v. Mo. Dep‘t of Corrs., 278 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (holding that
an execution protocol is not a rule and is therefore not subject to the state APA); Abdur‘Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 311 (Tenn. 2005) (interpreting the Tennessee
Uniform Administrative Procedure Act so as not to reach lethal injection).
99. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1374.
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dealers, strongly suggests that their primary goal is to carry out
executions, not to ensure that their execution procedures are
safe.100 Similarly, the continued use of paralytics helps demonstrate that some states are more concerned with the appearance
than the reality of their executions.
The institutional hierarchy of state governments may also help
explain state behavior in this area. Executions are a grisly business, and many state officials simply may not want to deal with it
themselves. Some officials, then, may want to pass the responsibility to others, delegating the procedure to independent contractors or to prison guards and officials who lack the training and
expertise to administer the procedures correctly.101
Remarkably, these delegations often provide for no accountability. For example, Missouri for years delegated its execution procedure to a doctor, who lowered the amount of anesthetic and
made other changes to the procedure without the knowledge of
102
correctional authorities. Missouri delegated ―total discretion‖
over its procedure to this doctor and did not oversee his actions.103
As a result, the State did not know that this doctor‘s dyslexia
made him unsure as to how much anesthetic he had prepared for
executions.104 Nor did it check the execution log to learn that the
drug doses had varied between executions.105 Nevertheless, even
though state officials did virtually nothing to oversee this doctor‘s
decisions, it vigorously resisted all efforts to inquire into its exe106
cution methods.
100. See James Gibson & Corinna Barrett Lain, Death Penalty Drugs & the International Moral Marketplace, 103 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 10), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2524124; Owen Bowcott, London
Firm Supplied Drugs for U.S. Executions, GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2011, 12:45 PM), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/06/london-firm-supplied-drugs-us-executions.
101. Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law
Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2083 (2011) [hereinafter
Berger, Norms].
102. Taylor v. Crawford (No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG), 2006 WL 1779035, at *7 (W.D. Mo.
June 26, 2006); Transcript of Testimony of John Doe No. 1 at 96–98, Taylor, 2006 WL
1779035 [hereinafter Doe Deposition].
103. See Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7.
104. See id. (―John Doe I also testified that he felt that he had the authority to change
or modify the formula as he saw fit. It is apparent that he has changed and modified the
protocol on several occasions in the past.‖); Doe Deposition, supra note 102, at 25 (―I am
dyslexic and so . . . it‘s not unusual for me to make mistakes.‖).
105. See Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7; Berger, Remedies, supra note 4, at 305.
106. See, e.g., Defendant‘s Response to Motion to Compel Discovery at 6, Clemons v.
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From a human perspective, it is understandable that individual officials would not want to engage closely with lethal injection
if they do not have to. Presumably, even some strong supporters
of capital punishment feel uneasy ending another human being‘s
life. Moreover, lethal injection falls far outside the expertise of
most DOC and prison officials, so many such officials may be relieved to rid themselves of this assignment. However, states delegation practices can make lethal injection more dangerous because the people implementing the procedure often lack the
expertise to do their tasks well.
Relatedly, delegation can also insulate lethal injection from
much needed revision. After all, the prison employees and independent contractors who frequently implement lethal injection
may not have the institutional authority to make changes to the
procedure themselves, even if they recognize problems. In other
words, even if the agents recognize problems, they may think
they lack the legal or political authority to make major changes.
Oklahoma‘s protocol, for example, vests entire discretion in the
prison warden to deal with problems that may arise.107 During the
botched execution of Clayton Lockett, initial attempts to insert
the catheter into various veins failed.108 The responsible physician, therefore, attempted to set the catheter in the femoral vein,
even though he did not have the proper sized catheter to access
it.109 Perhaps if this doctor had played a larger role in designing
and administering the procedure, he would have prepared for this
contingency in advance. Alternatively, if the Oklahoma protocol
had not vested entire discretion in the warden, perhaps this doctor could have halted the execution until the proper equipment
became available. Instead, the doctor proceeded, even though he
had never before attempted femoral access with such a short
110
catheter.

Crawford (No. 07-4129-CV-C-FJG), 2008 WL 2783233 (W.D. Mo. July 15, 2008); Berger,
Remedies, supra note 4, at 305.
107. See ANITA TRAMMELL, OKLA. ST. PENITENTIARY, PROCEDURES FOR THE EXECUTION
OF OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO DEATH 15–18 (2014).
108. See Lockett Execution Report, supra note 27, at 15–16.
109. Id. at 16 (noting that attempts to find a ―needle/catheter‖ between 1¾ inches and
2½ inches failed and that the largest available was only 1¼ inches).
110. See id.
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State secrecy likely exacerbates these institutional problems.
The physician and paramedic who attempted to set the catheter
in Lockett‘s execution proceeded anonymously.111 Accordingly,
public disclosure of the botch would not immediately reflect badly
on them, because the general public did not know their names.112
However, these individuals were, of course, known within the
prison, and presumably felt pressure from public officials to proceed with the execution, even when IV access was difficult to secure. Perhaps if the officials publicly responsible for the procedure were the same people who implemented the procedure‘s
difficult steps (such as setting the catheter), states would be more
likely to make revisions to guard against such botches.
Secrecy coupled with delegation, thus, makes it easier for
states to hide who is truly responsible. Though high-level officials
are ostensibly responsible for execution procedures, they usually
are not the actual people mixing the drugs, setting the catheter,
and monitoring an inmate‘s consciousness. Of course, no official
wants to see an execution botched on her watch, but when so
many aspects of a procedure are delegated down an institution‘s
hierarchy, it may be easier for officials to tell themselves that
particular issues are not their responsibility.113 The problem always lies at someone else‘s feet.
3. The Structure of Constitutional Tort Law
It is finally worth briefly noting that state officials and execution team members likely will not face legal repercussions if the
lethal injection procedures they design and implement cause suffering. First, because many states still use paralytics as part of
their procedures, inmates might feel pain that observers cannot
detect.114 Second, even when inmates seem to have suffered,

111. See TRAMMELL, supra note 107, at 8, 14.
112. A lawsuit filed by Clayton Lockett‘s family has since identified the doctor by
name. See Complaint at 7, Estate of Lockett v. Fallin et al., No. CIV-14-1119-HE (W.D.
Okla. Oct. 13, 2014).
113. Cf. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120
YALE L.J. 1032, 1078 (2011) (―When authority is allocated down within an agency, . . . .
[this will] reduce the political responsiveness of agency decisionmaking.‖).
114. See Suzanne C. Beyea, Addressing the Trauma of Anesthesia Awareness, 81 AORN
603, 603 (2005).
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states often claim that they did not.115 While these objections may
seem implausible, it is hard to prove that an inmate felt pain because he is deceased and obviously cannot testify as to his experience. Third, were an inmate‘s family to bring an action against a
state or state officials to recover for a botched execution, immunity doctrines would likely protect the state and its officials from
money damages.116 More specifically, state sovereign immunity
prohibits monetary awards against the state in the absence of a
statute waiving or abrogating such immunity, and qualified immunity would make it difficult to recover monetary damages from
responsible state officials.117 To this extent, the structure of constitutional tort law permits state officials to operate in this area
without worrying too much about serious personal consequences
if things go awry.
While most state officials will not deliberately cause harm, they
also operate in a world knowing that their mistakes will likely
not subject them to serious legal consequences. Moreover, because
states (understandably) keep the identity of their lethal injection
teams a secret, many participants in lethal injection administration also do not risk public embarrassment. To be sure, high-level
officials, such as prison wardens and directors of DOCs, may receive some public criticism for botched executions, but they often
are not directly involved in the administration of lethal drugs and
therefore can plausibly deflect the blame.118
C. Strategic Explanations
States also have strategic reasons for acting the way they do.
Viewed through this lens, states resist disclosing or revising their
115. See Botelho & Ford, supra note 10.
116. The families of Dennis McGuire and Clayton Lockett are currently suing state officials for their botched executions in Ohio and Oklahoma, respectively. See generally
Complaint, McGuire v. Mohr, No. 14-cv-00093 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 24, 2014); Complaint, In re
Lockett, No. CIV-14-1119-HE (W.D. Okla. Oct. 13, 2014) (showing that the families of
Lockett and McGuire are suing their respective states for violating the Eighth Amendment during the respective executions).
117. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that ―government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded
from [civil] liability [so long as] their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights‖); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974) (limiting Ex Parte
Young to prospective, rather than retrospective, relief).
118. Indeed, as noted above, these officials may even have an incentive to delegate the
procedure to other people. See supra Part II.B.2.
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execution procedures to help them defend lawsuits today, ward
off more litigation tomorrow, preserve the death penalty more
generally, and protect state fiscal concerns. As with the other explanations, these motives can interact with each other and with
other categories of explanations.
1. Litigation Strategy
Inmates frequently bring suits under 42 U.S.C. section 1983
challenging lethal injection procedures on Eighth Amendment
grounds.119 States predictably try to fend off such lawsuits. State
secrecy is an especially effective litigation tactic. Because states
often withhold many important details of their lethal injection
procedures, inmates bringing section 1983 actions often lack important information bearing on the risk of pain. Without such information, it is impossible to establish that the procedure in question creates a substantial risk of serious pain, because both the
lawyers and the judge lack crucial facts. Of course, if courts compelled states to turn over such details during the course of discovery, then secrecy would not be an effective litigation tactic. However, courts rarely require states to make such disclosures, so
state secrecy has in fact proven to be a successful litigation strategy thus far.120
Some state officials may also refuse to substantially rethink
their lethal injection procedures as part of a broader strategy to
persuade courts that there is nothing wrong with them. Were
states to concede the flaws in their procedures, courts may take
inmates‘ Eighth Amendment challenges seriously. As things
stand, courts very rarely rule against states in these cases.121
From the perspective of litigation strategy, the states have good
reason to continue pretending that nothing is wrong.
In fairness, many states may also believe that the inmates‘
Eighth Amendment challenges are bogus.122 To this extent, states
may feel like their litigation strategies are justified methods of
trying to discourage frivolous litigation that consumes state time

119.
120.
121.
122.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1371, 1373.
See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1606 (2003).
See supra Part II.A. But see supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
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and money. The fact that prison inmates litigate various issues
frequently through habeas and section 1983 actions likely further
adds to the states‘ belief that lethal injection challenges ought not
to be taken seriously.123 Indeed, by painting lethal injection actions as frivolous, states signal to courts that they should not
spend much time on them. Of course, courts owe inmates an independent review of the issues, but, to date, states often have
successfully persuaded courts that inmates‘ objections to their lethal injection procedures are not worthy of anything beyond the
most minimal judicial resources.124
2. Preserving the Death Penalty
State officials also care about preserving capital punishment
more generally. This consideration helps explain both state intransigence and state secrecy. State politicians and correctional
officials may resist modifying their procedures, and in particular
the drugs they use, because they fear that changes may jeopardize their ability to carry out executions at all. It can be difficult
for states to find a readily and consistently available supply of
drugs.125 Sometimes, states are forced to change drugs because
they can no longer get their old drugs, but when states have access to a particular drug source, they usually resist changes because an alternative can be difficult to find.126 Moreover, many
drugs also have expiration dates, so states cannot stockpile the
drugs for use in future years.127

123. See Schlanger, supra note 121, at 1557 (―In 1995, prison and jail inmates brought
about 40,000 new lawsuits in federal court—nearly a fifth of the federal civil docket.‖).
124. See, e.g., Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206, 215 (5th Cir. 1999) (describing the claim
that the state‘s lethal injection procedures violated the Eighth Amendment as ―border[ing]
on the legally frivolous‖); Fitzpatrick v. Bradshaw, No. 1:06–cv–356, 2008 WL 7055605, at
*62 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (dismissing the claim as ―without merit‖); Murphy v. Sirmons, 497 F.
Supp. 2d 1257, 1292–94 (E.D. Okla. 2007) (rejecting the lethal injection claim as ―frivolous‖); Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1387, 1425.
125. See Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1366 (noting the ―quandary‖ states face of having to use compounding pharmacies as a result of drug shortages).
126. See id. at 1362–66; Gibson & Lain, supra note 100 (manuscript at 12–14).
127. See, e.g., Ed Pilkington, Georgia Rushes Through Executions Before Lethal Injection Drugs Expire, GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2013, 12:35 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/feb/21/georgia-executions-lethal-injection-drug-pentobarbital (discussing Georgia‘s hasty execution of Andrew Allen Cook ―amid a legal scramble to carry out capital
sentences before its supply of lethal injection drugs reache[d] its expiry date‖).
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States also fear that disclosing information about their lethal
injection procedures, especially the names of their drug providers,
will jeopardize their ability to carry out executions at all. Major
pharmaceutical companies in recent years have stopped providing
drugs to states for use in executions.128 As a result, states have
had to turn to other sources for their drugs, especially compounding pharmacies.129 Inmates object that because compounding
pharmacies escape many FDA regulations, their products often
have not been evaluated for effectiveness and safety.130 There is
voluminous scientific evidence about the risks posed by some
compounded drugs,131 but states, for their part, worry that pressure on compounding pharmacies might scare them away, further
drying up viable lethal drugs.
To this extent, states promote secrecy so as to insulate compounding pharmacies from external pressure and harassment
that may dissuade them from continuing to supply drugs for exe132
cutions. Pharmacies, for their part, want to avoid bad publicity
linking them with executions. For example, in February 2014, a

128. Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1380–81; Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1360–
65.
129. Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1382. ―[U]nlike ‗Big Pharma‘ manufacturing facilities, [compounding pharmacies] are subject to less rigorous, consistent regulation.‖ Id.;
see also 21 U.S.C. § 353(a) (2012) (providing exceptions from other regulations for compounded drugs meeting certain requirements); Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1367; Gibson & Lain, supra note 100 (manuscript at 18) (discussing the differences between ―Big
Pharma‖ drugs and compounded drugs).
130. See, e.g., Plaintiff‘s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 1–2, Taylor v. Apothecary Shoppe, LLC (No. 14-CV-063-TCK-TLW), 2014 WL
631664 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 18, 2014) (challenging the compounding pharmacy‘s alleged provision of drugs for lethal injection).
131. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1382–84; Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at
1369–71 (summarizing FDA reports regarding the risks of compounding pharmacies).
132. See Editorial: Greg Abbott Switches Position on Death Row Drugs Sources, STARTELEGRAM (June 1, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://www.star-telegram.com/opinion/editorials/arti
cle3860246.html; Gary Grado, State Secret: Arizona Tries to Conceal Identity of Firm That
Makes Chemical for Lethal Injections, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES (Oct. 14, 2013, 7:52 AM), http:
//azcapitoltimes.com/news/2013/10/14/state-secret-arizona-tries-to-conceal-identity-of-firmthat-makes-chemical-for-lethal-injections/ (discussing the backlash, hate mail, and harassment received by compounding pharmacies); Brandi Grissom, TDCJ Refuses to Return
Execution Drugs to Pharmacist, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 7, 2013), https://www.texastribune.org/
2013/10/07/tdcj-refuses-return-execution-drugs-pharmacist/ (describing hate mail a compounding pharmacy received after it became public that it had provided drugs to Texas for
use in executions); Ed Pilkington, Texas Accuses Anti-Death Penalty Charity Reprieve of
Fomenting Violence, GUARDIAN (Mar. 28, 2012, 12:36 PM), http://www.theguardian.com
/world/2012/mar/28/death-penalty-texas-reprieve (noting the intimidation and harassment
of manufacturers of drugs used in lethal injections).
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compounding pharmacy sued by a death row inmate opted to settle the case, agreeing not to provide drugs for executions but also
refusing to acknowledge that it had ever planned to do so.133 Recognizing that many pharmacies want to avoid public relations
problems, states believe secrecy helps them protect their remaining drug sources and thereby preserve capital punishment more
generally.
D. Political Explanations
A final set of explanations for state behavior in this area is political. Prominent public officials, in particular, can use their actions and statements about lethal injection to signal that they are
tough on crime.134 Relatedly, state officials may want to signal to
victims‘ families and the public in general that they are doing
everything they can to carry out justice expeditiously. Indeed,
state officials frequently remind the public of the victim‘s suffer135
ing at the time of executions, even after botched executions.
This political explanation might have more resonance in states
like Texas and Oklahoma where support for the death penalty is
very strong, but even in other states, some state officials likely
feel that they have an obligation to the public to carry out lawfully imposed sentences. Indeed, Democratic politicians in some
states may feel additional pressure to support capital punishment
to burnish their anti-crime credentials and dispel concerns that
136
they are not sufficiently tough for public office.
133. See Gibson & Lain, supra note 100 (manuscript at 19); ASSOC. PRESS, Tulsa
Pharmacy Agrees Not to Provide Execution Drug, CBS NEWS (Feb. 17, 2014, 11:32 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/oklahoma-pharmacy-agrees-not-to-provide-drug-for-execu
tion/.
134. See John Caniglia, Lawmakers Seek Alternatives to Lethal Injection, As Death
Penalty Becomes Mired in Litigation, CLEVELAND.COM (Feb. 24, 2014, 7:27 AM), http://
www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2014/02/state_lawmakers_seek_alternati.html.
135. See Erik Eckholm, IV Misplaced in Oklahoma Execution, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2014, at A14.
136. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, The 1992 Campaign: Death Penalty; Arkansas Execution Raises Questions on Governor’s Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1992), http://www.nytim
es.com/1992/01/25/us/1992-campaign-death-penalty-arkansas-execution-raises-questionsgovernor-s.html (describing then-presidential candidate and Governor of Arkansas Bill
Clinton‘s decision to withhold executive clemency for the controversial execution of Ricky
Ray Rector so as not to appear soft on crime); Gregory Kline, State Democrats Are Soft on
Crime, BALT. SUN (Feb. 13, 2014, 8:36 AM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/
oped/bs-ed-red-maryland-0214-20140213-story.html (lambasting Governor O‘Malley who
recently abolished the death penalty in Maryland for being soft on crime).

BERGER 493.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

3/6/2015 4:21 PM

758

[Vol. 49:731

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

Elected officials also may resist careful appraisal of their procedures, because such appraisal may require substantially new
procedures, which would take time to implement. Some changes
require legislation, which obviously can be time consuming. Even
changes that do not require a new statute can require states to
procure new drugs, find new personnel, and design and practice
new procedures. Victims‘ families and some members of the public are already frustrated that the period between sentencing and
execution is so long,137 and state officials often do not want to add
to this frustration.138
It is even possible that some officials are so callous that they do
not care whether their execution procedures cause pain. It is
doubtful that this explanation is correct often, but it is possible
that the occasional official sees a painful death as part of the retribution the condemned deserves. Perhaps more likely is the possibility that some state officials do not intend to cause the inmate
pain but also feel that given the inmate‘s terrible crime, they
ought not spend excessive time and resources designing the safest
execution procedures.139
III. CONCLUSION: THE EXECUTIONERS‘ DILEMMAS
When I litigated the constitutionality of Missouri‘s lethal injec140
tion procedure in 2006 and 2007, I did not come away with the
137. See TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUST., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2012-STATISTICAL
TABLES 14 (2014), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/ cp12st.pdf
(noting the mean lapse in time between sentencing and execution for inmates in 2012 was
just under sixteen years); see also Adam Liptak, Lifelong Death Sentences, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 2011, at A16 (―[Five] percent of the 5826 death sentences imposed from 1973 to
1995 were carried out in those years.‖).
138. See, e.g., Michael Smerconish, Death Sentences Too Often Punish Victim’s Family—Not the Killer, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Aug. 3, 2014, 8:08 PM), http://www.dallasnews.
com/opinion/latest-columns/20140803-death-sentences-too-often-punish-victims-family-not-the-killer.ece.
139. Cf. Tina Rosenberg, The Deadlist D.A., N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 1995), http://www.ny
times.com/1995/07/16/magazine/the-deadliest-da.html?pagewanted=all
(statement
by
Philadelphia District Attorney) (―I‘ve looked at all those sentenced to be executed. No one
will shed a tear. Prison is too good for them. They don‘t deserve to live. I represent the victim and the family. I don‘t care about killers.‖).
140. See Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 054173-CV-C-FJG, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006); Eric Berger, Thoughts on
LB 36: Problems with the Proposed Bill to Institute Lethal Injection in Nebraska, 1 NEB. L.
REV. BULL. 14, 15 (2009), http://lawreviewbulletin.unl.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/ber
ger1.pdf.
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impression that the responsible state officials were vicious people
who enjoyed inflicting pain.141 Nor did I think that they had made
the decision to ignore the Constitution and get away with what
they could. Rather, I think the State had given some employees a
difficult task for which they were mostly poorly qualified. Some of
the participants may have been overconfident or even arrogant.
Some were careless. Still others were probably out of their depth,
tasked with an extremely difficult job without the training or resources to even know where to begin. On the whole, though, these
were people trying to do a job that the state had decided was important and had assigned to them.
To be sure, the precise motives of the various state actors differ. Each class of actors confronts separate incentives, pressures,
and problems. Generally speaking, politicians, such as governors
and elected attorneys general, may reap most of the political benefits (and bear most of the political risks) from refusing to alter
lethal injection because this stance, usually oblivious to the details of lethal injection, signals that they are tough on crime.142
Correctional officials, used to operating without oversight, may
seek to avoid attention by delegating the matter down the prison
bureaucracy or by outsourcing aspects of the procedure altogether. 143 Prison employee execution team members may just want to
follow orders within the ordinary chain of command. The commonality, though, may be that while most of these people probably approve of capital punishment in theory, few relish the actual
business of killing.
If anything, the problems with lethal injection may not be because the procedure‘s participants are vicious people who want to
inflict pain on ―the worst of the worst,‖ but because not enough
qualified people have the stomach for it.144 In state after state, the
practice has been for correctional officials to delegate the procedure down the agency hierarchy or outsource it entirely.145 From a
human perspective, it is entirely understandable that most people
141. See supra Part II.A (explaining that state officials may be convinced by experts
that procedures are safe and may not truly understand the drugs and their risks). This
impression is based on a combination of trial testimony, depositions, discovery documents,
and various interactions from the litigation. Id.
142. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 98, 101 and accompanying text.
144. See Denno, Paradox, supra note 4, at 66.
145. See Berger, Norms, supra note 101, at 2039.
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would not want to take responsibility for the procedure themselves. This collective reluctance, however, is part of the problem.
States have had trouble finding qualified people to design and
implement their procedures, and individuals‘ reluctance to take
charge of lethal injection has made it still harder for states to systematically address their procedures‘ dangers and to improve
them in meaningful ways.
Relatedly, to the extent lethal injection procedures sometimes
cause excruciating pain, many participants can (perhaps fairly)
claim that other members of the execution team bear more responsibility for those problems. Indeed, whether deliberately or
not, states often design execution procedures in ways that shield
participants‘ consciences from the feeling that they themselves
146
were personally responsible for the killing. When the firing
squad was commonplace, states frequently used multiple sharp
shooters and gave many of them blanks.147 Lethal injection in148
volves many team members, thereby dividing responsibility in a
way that might seem to avoid pinning moral accountability on
any single person. Indeed, some states‘ procedures use multiple
149
IV lines coming from a different room. Even within state bureaucracies, numerous people have partial responsibility over lethal injection. Such structures help to obstruct change.
This is not to excuse the mistakes these officials have made. On
the contrary, many state officials deserve serious criticism for the
150
way they have handled lethal injection, but it is also important
to recognize the dilemmas these officials face. Indeed, various
pressures make it hard for officials to take proactive steps to improve the safety and transparency of lethal injection. While there
is compelling evidence that lethal injection poses serious risks,
state officials with inadequate information make decisions based

146. See Michael J. Osofsky, Albert Bandura & Philip G. Zimbardo, The Role of Moral
Disengagement in the Execution Process, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 371, 385 (2005).
147. See LOUIS J. PALMER, JR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES: A
COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS 242 (2d ed. 2014) (―The use of blanks is
done so that the firing squad team will not know who actually killed the prisoner.‖).
148. Kevin Bonsor, Methods of Execution Have Changed With the Times, USA TODAY
(May 10, 2001, 2:36 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/science/stuffworks/2001-05
-10-lethal-injection.htm.
149. Id.
150. Taylor v. Crawford (No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG), 2006 WL 1779035, at *7–*8 (W.D.
Mo. June 26, 2006) (finding the execution procedure unconstitutional).
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on structural, strategic, and political concerns that might not be
readily apparent to outsiders. Collectively, states‘ practices make
executions more dangerous than they need to be, but given their
resources, knowledge, institutional obligations, and political constraints, the collective behavior of state actors, while hardly
commendable, is understandable.
Indeed, even the execution team member who genuinely wants
to encourage her state to substantially rethink its lethal injection
procedure faces sizable obstacles. If she voices her concerns, she
may risk angering political officials, her own administrative bosses, and even the general public. If this team member lacks a medical background, she may doubt her own ability to make fixes that
meaningfully improve the safety of lethal injections. If she does
have a medical background, she may worry that helping to improve the procedure may jeopardize her own standing in the medical community and risk her medical license and livelihood.151 If
she has qualms about capital punishment more generally, she
may also try to remove herself from the team rather than try to
improve the procedure. A well-intentioned execution team member might, in other words, realize that a serious problem exists,
but not know how to go about fixing it. Moreover, even if such a
person were confident in her abilities to improve the system, she
may lack the legal authority, political clout, or professional flexibility to make the necessary changes.
It is worth emphasizing that these pressures likely transcend
the lethal injection setting and help explain official behavior in
other contexts. The particulars would differ, of course, but when
state officials take actions that violate people‘s rights (or risk violating people‘s rights), they may not set out to do so. Instead, a
confluence of institutional pressures, epistemic limitations, strategic calculations, and political factors likely contribute to official
behavior. Officials may end up disrespecting important constitutional values, but more often than not, they likely feel various
pressures to select the route they have chosen. To acknowledge

151. See Welsh-Huggins, supra note 67. Dr. Dershwitz, for instance, decided to stop
testifying in lethal injection cases because he feared that the medical community may take
action against him. Id.
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these dilemmas is not to excuse constitutional violations, but rather to recognize that officials‘ jobs can be difficult and can present situations with seemingly no good options.
Of course, all this is speculative and general. State officials‘
behaviors differ from case to case, and no theory can fully explain
official behavior in all instances. Nevertheless, when criticizing
official governmental behavior, especially behavior that infringes
on constitutional rights, we should remember that state officials
usually act as they do for a reason. These reasons often do not
justify their behavior, but they can help us better understand
why states have bungled lethal injection so badly.

